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ECOLOGY, TRADE AND STATES IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. I test Bates’ view that trade across ecological divides promoted the develop-
ment of states in pre-colonial Africa. My main result is that sub-Saharan societies in
ecologically diverse environments had more centralized pre-colonial states. I use spa-
tial variation in rainfall to control for possible endogeneity. I construct artificial societies
and present narrative evidence to show the results are not due to conquest of trading re-
gions. I also test mechanisms by which trade may have caused states, and find that trade
supported class stratification between rulers and ruled.
1. INTRODUCTION
The states that existed in Africa before colonial rule continue to shape its modern de-
velopment. Pre-colonial state centralization is positively correlated with modern cross-
country differences in school attainment, literacy, paved roads and immunizations (Gen-
naioli and Rainer, 2007). It better predicts nighttime lights today than country-level
institutional quality (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2010). The few modern states
in Africa that inherited the legitimacy of a pre-colonial predecessor have done better
(Englebert, 2000). The parts of French West Africa with more centralized states before
colonial rule better resisted French settlement, but these same areas received less in-
vestment during the colonial period (Huillery, 2008). These recent empirical findings
are in line with those of historians and political scientists, who have argued that alien
rulers had to take African systems as given and build upon them during the colonial pe-
riod (Austin, 2008b; Berry, 1992; Mamdani, 1996). In other contexts, economists have
similarly found that the long historical roots of modern states are relevant for modern
development (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Bockstette et al., 2002; Iyer, 2007). Explaining
pre-colonial states, then, is necessary for understanding modern Africa.
In this paper, I test a “Ricardian” view of sub-Saharan states presented by Bates (1983),
in his Essays on the political economy of rural Africa. He builds on earlier arguments
made by Oliver and Fage (1962) and Vansina (1966), among others, who argued that
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TABLE 1. Bates’ Evidence
[Table 1 here]
long-distance trade required centralized authorities for administrative purposes, dif-
fused concepts of centralized polities, and stimulated territorial expansion (Bisson, 1982).
His model is verbal:
One of the basic arguments linking political centralization with economic
reward rests upon the desire of people to benefit from the gains in welfare
which can be reaped from markets. In essence, the argument is Ricar-
dian... the contribution of the state is to provide order and peace and
thereby to render production and exchange possible for members of so-
ciety. The origins of the state, then, lie in the welfare gains that can be
reaped through the promotion of markets.
He suggests that gains from trade are greatest where products from one ecological zone
can be traded for products from another. It is near ecological divides, then, that we
should expect to see states. To support his view, he takes 34 pre-colonial African so-
cieties, asks whether they “abut an ecological divide,” and classifies them as having a
“kinship” political structure, “chiefs,” or “central monarchs.” I present a condensed ver-
sion of his results in Table 1. The proportion of societies with central monarchs is greater
on an ecological divide.
In this paper, I argue that Bates (1983) is ultimately correct. His argument has been
overlooked because his sample size prevents him making a credible econometric argu-
ment that this correlation is causal. In this paper, I use ethnographic and geographic
data to overcome this limitation. I take data on state centralization for 440 societies
in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. Merging
the map of African ethnic groups from Murdock (1959) with information on African eco-
logical zones from White (1983), I am able to compute for each society an index of its
“ecological diversity,” which I take as a proxy for the gains from trade that existed before
colonial rule. I show that this index is strongly related to the presence of pre-colonial
states. I use spatial variation in rainfall to control for possible reverse causation, and
show that the OLS estimates of the impact of ecological diversity are not overstated. I
also use exogenous geographic features to predict raster-level ecological regions, and
find that the diversity measured by these predicted points is also related to pre-colonial
African states. The relationship between trade and states is robust to several additional
controls, removing influential observations, alternative measures of states and trade,
and a variety of estimation strategies.
I show that the “Ricardian” view better explains the relationship between states and
diverse ecology than six alternative stories. First, while larger territories may require
more levels of administration and may be more diverse, area does not explain away the
relationship between ecological diversity and states. Second, because panel data are not
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available for these ethnic groups, I am not able to conclusively show that societies that
independently developed state centralization did not migrate to capture the regions in
which the gains from trade were high. In order to argue that this does not explain my
results, I construct artificial societies and present narrative evidence on the histories of
the most influential observations in the data. By adding similar controls, I am able to
show that two other stories – dense population in diverse regions and defense of “is-
lands” of land quality – do not explain away the relationship between trade and states.
Fifth, I show that the diversity of grains available for cultivation do not explain away
the main results. Sixth, while diverse areas are more ethnically fractionalized, ecology
directly impacts states even when this is included in the sample of artificial countries.
I test for several mechanisms by which trade may have facilitated state centralization,
and find that class stratification is the channel best supported by the data. No one type
of trade is shown to be more important than others.
The Ricardian view is only one of many theories of the long-run geographic origins of
strong states. It is not my aim, however, to test the Ricardian view against these except
insofar as they may also explain the observed link between states and ecological di-
versity. Diamond (1997) argues that Eurasian endowments of domesticable plants and
animals, combined with an East-West orientation that facilitated their diffusion, gave
that landmass an early advantage over the Americas and Africa. Jones (2003) makes an
argument for Europe that is remarkably similar to the Ricardian view, stating that:
In Europe’s case, the most relevant aspect of the resource endowment was
probably the way it was dispersed across a geologically and climatically
varied continent, since this provided an inducement to trade (p. xxxii).
Specifically, he suggests that the gains from bulk, low value trade encouraged rulers to
gain their revenues through taxation of protected trade, rather than the arbitrary confis-
cations that would be possible with trade in luxuries (p. 89). Olson (1993), by contrast,
suggests that above the level of hunter-gatherers, most societies have some vestige of a
state because it is in the interests of “roving” bandits to establish themselves as ruling
“stationary” bandits and encourage economic activity that they can tax. In this light, my
study highlights a geographic condition that makes this possible through trade. States
are only one of many imperfect ways to govern the market (Dixit, 2004), and this study
then draws attention to one condition under which they emerge. There are also reasons
why we might expect ecological homogeneity to facilitate trade and states. Societies
that can only produce a narrow range of goods may be compelled to trade. Moav and
Mayshar (2011) suggest that the homogeneity of ancient Egypt benefitted that state’s
centralization, compared with Israel and Babylon. Because all farmers depended on the
Nile flood, which could be easily monitored, the state was uniquely able to tax them
effectively.
Similarly, this Ricardian view of the origins of pre-colonial African states contrasts
with other, though not necessarily rival, theories of African political centralization. Again,
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it is not the purpose of this paper to test between these hypotheses unless they are al-
ternative explanations of the relationship between ecological diversity and states. First,
the “land-abundance” view (Austin, 2008a; Herbst, 2000) of Africa argues that the rel-
ative absence of large states in pre-colonial Africa was the result of sparse population.
Unable to tax land, which had little value, African states had to rely on trade taxes for
revenue. This is to be understood in contrast with the view of Tilly and Ardant (1975),
who argue that it was the need to secure and defend territory that gave rise to modern
nation states in Europe. I show in this paper that, even controlling for population den-
sity, gains from trade allowed states to exist in Africa. Second, contributions by Nunn
(2008) and Robinson (2002) have built on older views, such as those of Rodney (1972),
and argued that the slave trade and colonial rule undermined institutional development
in Africa, including state centralization. I show that the relationship between states and
ecology is robust to measures of access to the transatlantic slave trade.
In the remainder of this paper, I proceed as follows. In section 2, I describe my sources
of data, how I measure state centralization, and how I compute ecological diversity for
each society. In section 3, I outline the principal econometric specification and the
baseline results. In section 4, I demonstrate the robustness of these results to endo-
geneity, unobserved heterogeneity, influential observations, and alternative measures
of trade and states. In section 5, I give evidence that five alternative stories – area ne-
cessitates centralization, states migrate to capture gains from trade, states emerge to
protect “islands” of land quality in otherwise barren regions, ecological diversity prox-
ies for population density, and ecological diversity produces ethnic diversity – do not
explain the results. In section 6, I present suggestive evidence that centralized states
emerged from trade because it supported class differentiation, and that no one type of
trade mattered most. In section 7, I conclude.
2. DATA
In order to test the Ricardian theory of African states empirically, I need data on three
things – African states, the gains from trade, and other variables whose omission could
potentially bias the results. In this section I describe my sources of for each.
To measure African states, I take data from Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. This
was originally published in 29 issues of Ethnology between 1962 and 1980. It contains
data on 1267 societies from around the world.1 From this source, I use variable 33, “Ju-
risdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community” to measure state centralization. This
gives a discrete categorization between “No Levels” and “Four Levels.” This is the same
1In particular, I use the revised Atlas posted online by J. Patrick Gray at
http://eclectic.ss.uci.edu/˜drwhite/worldcul/EthnographicAtlasWCRevisedByWorldCultures.sav.
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FIGURE 1. State centralization
Source: (Murdock, 1967). Darker regions have more centralized states.
variable that was used by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010), and originally con-
verted by Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) into a discrete variable to capture the same con-
cept.2 The sample used for the analysis consists of the 440 sub-Saharan societies, in-
cluding Madagascar, for which this variable is not missing. I map this measure of state
centralization on Murdock’s (1959) ethnic map of Africa in Figure 1.3
To measure the gains from trade, I follow Bates (1983) in assuming that the ability
to trade across ecological zones will be particularly beneficial. To get information on
ecology, I use White’s (1983) vegetation map of Africa.4 This classifies African vegetation
into 17 major types, which I plot in Figure 2.5
2In particular, they took a society as “centralized” if it had at least one level of jurisdiction above the local,
and weighted this by each society’s share in the national population in 1960 to construct a country-level
measure of pre-colonial state centralization in Africa.
3This map is available on Nathan Nunn’s website.
4This is available at http://www.grid.unep.ch/data/download/gnv031.zip.
5Altimontaine, anthropic, azonal, bushland and thicket, bushland and thicket mosaic, cape shrubland,
desert, edaphic grassland mosaic, forest, forest transition and mosaic, grassland, grassy shrubland, sec-
ondary wooded grassland, semi-desert, traditional scrubland, woodland, woodland mosaics and transi-
tions.
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FIGURE 2. Vegetation types and ecological diversity
Source: White (1983). In the left-hand map of vegetation types, each shade of grey represents a different
one of each of the sixteen major types. In the right-hand side map of ecological diversity, darker regions
are more ecologically diverse
To construct a measure of how location relative to these regions could give rise to
gains from trade, I calculate the share sti of each society i’s area that is occupied by each
ecological type t. Then, I use a Herfindahl index to construct a measure of each society’s
ecological diversity:
(1) Ecological diversityi = 1−
t=17∑
t=1
(sti)
2.
The economic analogy for this measure is that, if ethnic groups were markets, vegeta-
tion types were firms and these area shares were market shares, this would be an index
of the competitiveness of the market. As more ecological zones intersect a society’s area,
the natural ability to trade increases, and the index rises. I show a map of this variable
in Figure 2. Visually comparing Figures 1 and 2, it is apparent that the most centralized
African states are clustered along an East-West line between the Sahara desert and West
African forest zone, in the diverse microclimates of the Ethiopian highlands, along the
barrier between the equatorial rainforest and the East and Central African woodland
mosaics, and on the divide between grassland and woodland in the continent’s south-
eastern corner. In section 4, I show that distance from an ecological divide performs
as well as this index at predicting states, as does an alternative index created from FAO
data. Summary statistics for the main measures of states and trade, as well as alterna-
tives that will be explained later in the paper, are included in Table 2.
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TABLE 2. Summary statistics
[Table 2 here]
It is possible that, even if there is a strong correlation between ecological diversity and
state centralization, this is due to omitted variables correlated with the diversity index.
I am able to join several other geographic variables to the data on ecology and states
using the Murdock (1959) map of Africa. Except where I note otherwise, I take data
stored in raster format, and for each society I compute the average value of the points
within its territory.6 In particular, I control for:
Major river : This is a dummy that equals one if the Benue, Blue Nile, Chire, Congo,
Lualaba, Lukaga, Niger, Nile, Orange, Ubangi, White Nile, or Zambezi Rivers inter-
sect the ethnic group’s territory.
Ag. constraints: This is an index of combined climate, soil and terrain slope con-
strains on rain-fed agriculture, taken from the FAO-GAEZ project (see Fischer et al.
(2001)). I interpret it as an inverse measure of land quality.
Dist. coast : This is average distance from each point in the ethnic group territory to
the nearest point on the coast, in decimal degrees, calculated in ArcMap.
Elevation: This is average elevation in meters.
Malaria: This is average climatic suitability for malaria transmission, computed by
Adjuik et al. (1998).
Precipitation: This is average annual precipitation (mm). Because some societies
are too small for a raster point to fall within their territory, I impute missing data
using the nearest raster point.
Ruggedness: This is a measure of terrain ruggedness used by Nunn and Puga (2009).
It computes the average absolute difference between an elevation grid cell and its
neighbors.
Temperature: This is the accumulated temperature on days with mean daily tem-
perature above 0◦C, computed using monthly data from 1961 to 2000 collected by
the Climate Research Unit (CRU) of the University of East Anglia. I treat 55537 is
as an error code and drop these points. I impute missing values using the nearest
raster point.
Dist. L. Victoria: I compute the distance between each ethnic group’s centroid and
Lake Victoria using the globdist function in Stata.
6Raster data taken from the following sources: Ag. Constraints, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/
LUC/SAEZ/index.html, plate 28; Elevation, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/; Malaria, http://www.
mara.org.za/lite/download.htm; Precipitation, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/SAEZ/index.
html, plate 1; Temperature, http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/SAEZ/index.html, plate 6; Rugged-
ness, http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/.
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TABLE 3. Summary statistics
[Table 3 here]
Date observed: This is the rough date at which the information on the society was
recorded, according to the Ethnographic Atlas. Dates of observation are missing
for the Bomvana and Betsileo. I recode the Bomvana to 1850, to match the date of
observation for the other Xhosa. I recode the Betsileo to 1900, the modal date for
the other Malagasy societies in the data.
Dist. Atlantic ST : This is the minimum distance between the ethnic group’s centroid
and the nearest major source of new world demand for slaves (Virginia, Havana,
Haiti, Kingston, Dominica, Martinique, Guyana, Salvador, or Rio), computed using
the globdist function in Stata. The choice of ports here follows Nunn (2008).
Dist. Indian ST : This is, similarly, the distance to the nearest of Mauritius and Mus-
cat.
Dist Saharan ST : This is the minimum distance to Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Benghazi,
or Cairo.
Dist Red ST : This is the minimum distance to Mussawa, Suakin, or Djibouti.
Crop type: I construct dummy variables out of the major crop types recorded in the
Ethnographic Atlas. I treat these as exogenous characteristics of the natural envi-
ronment, not as choices.
Summary statistics for these controls and any other variables used in the later analysis
are given in Table 3. It is clear that the greatest difficulty with these data are that they
are anachronistic – the institutional variables are recorded at an earlier date than the
geographic controls and the measure of ecological diversity. Insofar as broad differences
across regions in their capacities for rainfed agriculture, terrain ruggedness, ecological
regions and similar variables do not change much, this should only add measurement
error to the analysis. It is possible, however, that states transform their environments
in ways that non-state societies cannot. I use both instrumental variables and non-
anthropogenic predictors of ecological types in Section 4 to address this concern.
3. RESULTS
Before undertaking more sophisticated econometric tests, it is worth investigating
whether there is a visible unconditional relationship between the ecological measure of
gains from trade and state centralization. Because centralization is a discrete variable,
a scatter plot will not present the data clearly. Instead, in Figure 3, I cut the sample into
two – societies above and below the median in terms of ecological diversity. For each, I
show a histogram of the relative frequencies of states of each level of centralization. It is
clear that, below the median (the lighter bars), it is more common for societies to have
no levels jurisdiction above the local, or one level. Above the median, there is a greater
concentration of societies with two or three levels of jurisdiction. Both above and below
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FIGURE 3. State centralization when ecological diversity is above and be-
low the median
The dark bars are for ecological diversity above the median, the light bars for ecological diversity below
it. Percentage is on the y axis and levels of jurisdiction on the x axis.
the median, it is quite uncommon for societies to have four such levels. The general pat-
tern is clear; as ecological variation rises, the distribution of state centralization skews
to the right.
To test econometrically whether there the gains from trade due to ecological diversity
predict the existence of centralized states in pre-colonial Africa, I estimate the following
using an ordered probit:
(2) State centralizationi = α + βEcological diversityi +X
′
iγ + i.
In (2), state centralization is the number of levels of jurisdiction recorded by the Ethno-
graphic Atlas. Ecological diversity is the index defined above. The matrixXi includes the
other controls reported listed in section 2, as well as (in some specifications) dummy
variables for the thirteen ethnographic regions recorded in the sample.7 Standard er-
rors are clustered by region.
Table 4 presents the resulting estimates of β. I report the full set of coefficient es-
timates in Table 19 in the appendix, omitting them in the text for space. In column 1,
only the measure of ecological diversity is included. Ecological diversity has a significant
7These are: African Hunters, South African Bantu, Central Bantu, Northeast Bantu, Equatorial Bantu,
Guinea Coast, Western Sudan, Nigerian Plateau, Eastern Sudan, Upper Nile, Ethiopia/Horn, Moslem Su-
dan, and Indian Ocean.
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TABLE 4. Main results
[Table 4 here]
and positive correlation with state centralization. This is robust to the inclusion of ad-
ditional controls in column 2, and the coefficient does not fall by much. While regional
dummies do knock away some of the magnitude of the coefficient estimate, it remains
significant at the 10% level. Surprisingly, few of the additional controls are statistically
significant. The exceptions are elevation (positive in column 3), date of observation
(negative in both columns), no major crop (negative in column 2), roots and tubers
(positive in columns 2 and 3), major river (positive in columns 2 and 3), and rugged-
ness (positive in both columns). The positive effect of elevation is likely capturing ben-
efits associated with mountainous regions, such as defensibility, less susceptibility to
disease, and soil fertility. The negative effect of the date of observation likely suggests
that colonial-era anthropologists chose to first study the least remote and most central-
ized African societies – the low hanging academic fruit. The negative effect of no major
crop suggests that it is difficult to form a state without an agrarian base of any sort. The
positive effect of roots and tubers is a surprise, and is likely proxying for unobservable
features of forest-zone Bantu societies that better enabled them to create states. Major
rivers are associated with trade, and further suggest that the Ricardian view of African
states is largely correct. Ruggedness will be related to defensibility. Following Nunn and
Puga (2009), it also predicts the ability of African societies to have escaped the worst
effects of the slave trades.
Is the effect of ecological diversity large? In Table 4, I report the marginal effects of
ecological diversity for each of the three specifications. Across specifications, the mar-
ginal effect of a one unit change in ecological diversity is to reduce the probability of
having no levels of jurisdiction above the local by roughly 13-26 percentage points; the
probabilities of having two or three levels increase to match this, though the effect is
slightly stronger for three levels. A one unit change corresponds with a move of roughly
four standard deviations in the ecological diversity measure. At a first glance, this would
appear to suggest that the effect, while statistically significant, is small. However, eco-
logical diversity has a very clearly bimodal distribution (see Figure 4). A move from one
peak at zero to the other peak, at roughly 0.5, better captures the comparison between
“diverse” and homogenous societies. This would suggest, then, that were a society to be
taken from an ecologically homogenous region and placed in one that was typically di-
verse, the probability of having some form of state centralization would rise very roughly
between 6 and 13 percentage points.
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FIGURE 4. Kernel density of ecological diversity
4. ROBUSTNESS
4.1. Validity of the state centralization measure. The measure of state centralization
I use is far from ideal. One deficiency is that weak but pyramidal states will appear to
be centralized in this data. The Bemba, as an example, have two levels of jurisdiction
above the local. I would like to replicate these results with alternative measures of state
strength. I am not, however, aware of any similar measure available for more than a
small sub-sample of the ethnic groups in my data. Instead, I take two other approaches
to validate the state centralization measure.
First, I show that it is strongly correlated with other measures of states for which I
have data in other samples. Bockstette et al. (2002) and Chanda and Putterman (2007)
construct indices of “state antiquity” for modern countries that reflect, in a given fifty
year period, a) the existence of a government, b) the proportion of the modern coun-
try’s territory covered, and c) whether the state was indigenous or externally imposed. I
take this measure for the period 1850-1900 as a measure of state strength from roughly
the same period as the centralization index. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) aggregate the
state centralization index to the country level using ethnic groups’ population shares
reported in the Atlas Narodov Mira. For 41 countries, I have both of the antiquity and
centralization measures. In Figure 5, I show that there is a positive correlation between
country-level centralization and state antiquity in the late nineteenth century.
Similarly, the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS) is a sub-sample of 186 societies
recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas for which much larger number of variables are avail-
able. I have not used these in the present study, since only 28 societies in the SCCS
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FIGURE 5. State antiquity and state centralization
State centralization is the country-level measure of Gennaioli and Rainer (2007). State antiquity is the
variable “aosnew2,” covering the period 1851-1900, based on Bockstette et al. (2002), and available on
Louis Putterman’s website. The regression coefficient is 15.096, and the standard error is 4.970. There
are 41 observations.
TABLE 5. Robustness: Regressions of alternative SCCS measures of states
on state centralization
[Table 5 here]
TABLE 6. Robustness: Alternative measures of states and diversity
[Table 6 here]
from sub-Saharan Africa. I can, however, show that the centralization measure I use
is strongly correlated with the other measures of states coded in the SCCS.8 For nearly
thirty variables from the SCCS that capture ordinal measures of various aspects of state
strength, I regress the variable on my measure of state centralization and report the re-
sults in Table 5. All of these are significantly related to state centralization, whether they
measure the existence of a police force, the presence of taxation, or the capacity of states
to enforce their decrees. The measure used in this study, then, is a valid proxy for state
strength.
Second, I recode the state centralization measure into a dummy that equals one if
the society has any levels of jurisdiction above the local. This may better capture state
strength if, for example, it is impossible for a central authority to delegate administrative
functions to regional leaders without also losing some control over them. I show in Table
6 that this measure is also positively related to ecological diversity.
8The centralization measure is v237 in the SCCS.
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TABLE 7. Robustness: Estimation methods
4.2. Validity of the gains from trade measure. While ecological variation captures to
some degree the presence of gains from trade, it is not clear that it is the best measure
available. Bates (1983) divides societies into those that abut a divide, those that are di-
verse, and those that have no significant variation. As an alternative measure of the
gains from trade, I use the White (1983) map to compute the average distance (in deci-
mal degrees) of all points in a group’s territory from the nearest boundary between two
ecological regions. I present the results in Table 6. The statistical robustness of these
results is stronger than the results obtained using ecological diversity. The results are
consistent with a one standard deviation increase in the distance from an ecological di-
vide raising the probability of having no levels of jurisdiction above the local by roughly
5 percentage points, with this increase coming from reductions in the probabilities that
a society would have two or three levels of jurisdiction. Results using a binary indica-
tor for whether the society is diverse at all (equivalent to whether it is intersected by
a divide) are similar. Finally, because some of the ecological types recorded in White’s
map are similar, potentially leading to over-estimation of ecological diversity, I collapse
these classifications into eight “simpler” types.9 Results are again similar, though the ef-
fect of ecological diversity becomes marginally insignificant when regional fixed effects
are added. Simplifying the classes in this manner does not do away with the sharply
bi-modal distribution of diversity.
In addition, the FAO-GAEZ project created its own separate classification of ecologi-
cal zones that can be used to construct an alternative diversity measure.10 This source
categorizes raster points in Africa into eleven “dominant ecosystem classes.”11 For each
ethnic group in the data, I construct a measure analogous to that in (1) using the share
of raster points for each ecosystem class, rather than the share of area. Results using this
alternative measure of ecological diversity are presented in Table 6. As with the distance
from an ecological divide, the coefficient estimates here are more statistically robust
than main results.
4.3. Validity of the estimation. There are many possible reasons the approach taken
to the estimation may be questioned. First, the “parallel regression” assumption of the
standard ordered probit model, that the explanatory variables have the same impact on
9Mountain if altimontane, other if anthropic, water or azonal, bushland if bushland and thicket or bush-
land and thicket mosaics, shrub if cape shrubland, transitional scrubland or grassy shrubland, desert if
desert or semi-desert, grassland if grassland, secondary wooded grassland or edaphic grassland mosaics,
forest if forest or forest transitions and mosaics, and woodland if woodland or woodland mosaics and
transitions.
10This is plate 55, downloaded from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/GAEZ/index.htm.
11These are Undefined; Grassland; Woodland; Forest; Mosaics including crops; Cropland; Intensive crop-
land; Wetlands; Desert, bare land; Water and coastal fringes; Ice, cold desert, tundra; and Urban agglom-
erates.
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TABLE 8. Robustness: Influential observations
[Table 8 here]
the latent index at all points, is often violated in real data. In Table 7, I re-estimate the
main results using a generalized ordered probit model (Maddala, 1986), in which the co-
efficients on the latent variables are allowed to vary with the points where the categories
of the dependent variable are separated. Convergence could not be achieved with re-
gional fixed effects, so this specification is not reported. As before, ecological diversity
predicts greater state centralization. Here, it is clear that this effect is not confined to
any single level of centralization. Excepting at four levels, for which few observations
exist, the effect is positive throughout.
Another potential concern is that, with only 440 observations in most specifications
and thirteen regions, the clusters used for the standard errors may be too small. I have
re-defined alternative clusters corresponding roughly to the United Nations’ division of
Africa into regions – Southern Africa (African Hunters, South African Bantu), Western
Africa (Guinea Coast, Western Sudan, Nigerian Plateau, Moslem Sudan), Central Africa
(Central Bantu, Equatorial Bantu, Eastern Sudan) and Eastern Africa (Northeast Bantu,
Upper Nile, Ethiopia/Horn, Indian Ocean). Re-estimating the main results, I show in
Table 7 that the results are now more statistically robust. The coefficient estimate falls
less with the addition of these broader fixed effects than with fixed effects added for the
regions as defined in the Ethnographic Atlas.
Finally, the inclusion of the major river dummy and distances from the coast, Lake
Victoria, and slave trade ports may be capturing elements of trade based on features
other than ecological diversity. Similarly, while the inclusion of the date of observation
is intended to control for both remoteness and the possible impacts of European in-
fluence, it may be endogenous to state centralization. I show in Table 7 that excluding
these variables barely affects the results.
It is also possible that the results here are driven by outliers. In Table 8, I control for
this possibility by dropping influential observations from the sample. I estimate the
main results by OLS with the full set of controls and without fixed effects. I then com-
pute the leverage and dfbeta (for ecological diversity) statistics for each observation. In
column 1 of Table 8, I drop all observations with leverage greater than 2(df + 2)/N . In
column 2, I remove any observations with absolute dfbeta greater than 2/
√
N . The main
result survives both of these procedures, though the former is marginally insignificant
when fixed effects are included. It is also possible that the results are spuriously iden-
tified by variation within a single African region. In columns 3 through 6, I drop each
of the “South African bantu,” “Ethiopia/horn,” ‘Moslem sudan” and “Indian Ocean” in
turn. These are the regions in which most states are concentrated. The results again
are robust to each of these, though some are again marginally insignificant with fixed
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effects. It is not the contrast between a handful of states and their neighbors that is
driving the results.
4.4. Possible reverse causation. It is also possible that stronger states shape the en-
vironment; McCann (1999) describes, for example, the careful regulation of forest re-
sources in Ethiopia before the twentieth century. To control for this possible reverse
causation, I employ the standard deviation of temperature within an ethnic group’s ter-
ritory as an instrument for its Ecological diversity. This is intended to capture varia-
tion in ecological conditions that are beyond human control, and which give rise to dif-
ferences in actual vegetation. The disadvantage of this instrument is that it cannot be
computed for societies so small that they have only one raster point for temperature, or
whose temperature measure was imputed from a nearest neighbor. I present the results
in Table 9. In columns 1 through 3, I replicate the main results from Table 4 using OLS,
for comparability with the other columns. In columns 4 through 6, I repeat the analysis,
but restrict the sample to societies for which the instrument is available. The coefficient
estimates are roughly similar, suggesting that selection into non-missing observations
of temperature variance will not drive the results. In columns 7 through 9, I present
the IV results. I also present the Kleibergen-Paap Lagrange multiplier and F statistics.
While these are less statistically robust than the OLS results, the coefficients grow larger.
There is no evidence that the ordered probit estimates overstate the effect of ecologi-
cal diversity on state centralization. This argument is analogous to Frankel and Romer
(1999), who instrument for trade openness using using geographical features in a cross-
country setting and find that, while their effects are statistically insignificant, there is no
evidence that OLS overstates the causal effect of trade on growth.
I am also able to use the FAO classifications to construct an alternative measure of
ecological diversity that is not endogenous to human action. For each of the 365,788
raster points in that data, I regress an indicator for each of the eleven ecosystem classes
on deciles in latitude, longitude, average precipitation, distance from the coast, accu-
mulated temperatures above five and ten degrees, ruggedness, length of the growing
period, and terrain slope, as well as dummies for each type of thermal growing period,
frost-free period, and soil class.12 From each of these linear regressions, I take the linear
prediction as the probability that the raster point falls into that ecosystem type. I take
the most probable class as the predicted type, and I am able to correctly predict a bit
12All of these are downloaded from the FAO-GAEZ website, calculated in ArcMap, or already described
above, except for soil type, which is taken from Zobler’s grouping of the world’s soils into 106 classes such
as “Eutric Cambisoils,” downloaded from the UNEP website. These often differ from the resolution of the
ecosystem raster, and so the nearest raster point in each plate is used.
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FIGURE 6. Kernel density of predicted ecological diversity (FAO)
TABLE 10. Robustness: Reverse causation
[Table 10 here]
more than 70% of the raster points by this method. I re-calculate the diversity index us-
ing these predicted types. The results using this as a diversity measure are presented in
Table 9. I continue to find that this predicts state centralization, except when regional
fixed effects are included. This degree of robustness is surprising; because this method
is particularly bad at predicting raster points in the less common ecological types, it
under-predicts ecological diversity (see the kernel density in Figure 6). This further sug-
gests the results are not due to strong states transforming their landscapes.
4.5. Possible omitted heterogeneity. As with any cross-sectional analysis, one of the
most pernicious concerns is that the results are driven by unobservables that happen
to be correlated with the causal variable of interest – in this case ecological diversity.
While I have included an index of ecological diversity constructed from the area shares
sti of each ecological type for each ethnic group, I have not generally controlled for these
directly. This is primarily for statistical power. These may, however, be significant de-
terminants of states and correlated with ecological diversity. In Table 10 I add these as
additional controls. The estimated effect of diversity is now larger, and more statistically
robust.
Similarly, the inclusion of regional fixed effects may not fully capture the presence
of localized unobservables. In the first panel of Table 10, I include quartics in latitude
and longitude, which allow unobservables to vary smoothly across space. The results
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are robust to including this, though they become insignificant when region fixed effects
are also included. This is not surprising, since this leaves little variation in the data to
provide identification.
In Table 10, I also account for omitted heterogeneity by re-estimating the main re-
sults using a spatial error model. This replaces the vector of errors in (2) with a spatially-
weighted vector λW, and a vector of iid errors, u. W is a row-normalized spatial weights
matrix. I select W so that all societies whose centroids are within ten decimal degrees
of each other are given a weight inversely proportionate to their distance from each
other. I report the results in Table 10.13 The effect of ecological diversity remains sta-
tistically significant before fixed effects are included, though the estimated coefficients
are smaller than in Table 9. Once additional controls are added, I find no evidence that
λ is statistically significant. This may be because neighbors’ observables fully explain
correlations in states across space. In Table 10 I add the observable X of each society’s
neighbors, weighted by the matrix W . While these are strongly significant – neighbors’
characteristics matter – a Moran’s I test conducted on the residuals suggests that there
is no spatial correlation conditional on these.
In Section 5, I attempt to deal with specific unobservables that are related to alterna-
tive interpretations of the data.
Finally, I take three more general approaches to deal with unobservables. First, I
use the strategy suggested by Wooldridge (2002) for testing robustness to unobserved
heterogeneity. I de-mean all of the standard controls included in Table 4, and interact
them with my ecological diversity measure. A similar approach is used by Bhalotra and
Cochrane (2010), for example. Results are reported in Table 10. I find that, while some of
these interactions are significant, they do little to diminish the main result, suggesting
that it cannot be explained away by heterogeneous treatment effects once controls are
added.
Second, I employ a nearest neighbor matching estimator in order to shift the bulk
of identifying variation to those observations that are most similar along their observ-
ables.14 Because these estimators consider a binary “treatment,” I divide the sample
into observations above and below the median in ecological diversity. Results are given
in Table 10. The main results look qualitatively similar using this measure of ecological
diversity. If observations are matched using their observable controls (column 4), the
difference in state centralization between “treated” and “untreated” societies (the aver-
age treatment effect) remains statistically significant and is similar in magnitude to the
comparable regression in column 2.
Third, I compute Altonji-Elder-Taber statistics. Replicating the main regression us-
ing OLS, I obtain the estimated coefficient on ecological diversity βˆ1 and the estimated
variance of the residuals Vˆ1. Regressing state centralization on the controls, I obtain
13In particular, I use the spatwmat and spatreg commands in Stata.
14In particular, I use the nnmatch command in Stata.
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FIGURE 7. Ecological diversity and state centralization for artificial coun-
tries
Source: Murdock (1967) and White (1983). In the left-hand map of ecological diversity, darker regions
are more diverse. In the right-hand map of state centralization, darker regions are more centralized.
the predicted values xb and the estimated variance of the residuals Vˆ2. Regressing eco-
logical diversity on xb, I obtain the coefficient estimate βˆ2. Altonji et al. (2005) suggest
that if βˆ1Vˆ2
βˆ2Vˆ1
> 1, it is unlikely that unobservables will explain away the result of interest.
The estimates reported, 4.51 if fixed effects are not included and 3.08 if they are, do not
support selection on the unobservables.
5. ALTERNATIVE STORIES
The results presented so far are not, however, completely dispositive. They are consis-
tent with at least five alternative stories of the relationship between ecology, trade and
states in pre-colonial Africa. In the remainder of this section, I give evidence that the
Ricardian view of African states better fits the data.
5.1. Larger areas are more diverse and require more centralized administration. It
is possible that, if administering a larger area requires more levels of administration,
states that happen to cover greater territories for reasons unrelated to their strength will
appear more centralized in the data. Further, larger areas may be mechanically more
likely to be ecologically diverse. Conversely, there is the “territorial expansion model”
of Spencer (1998, 2010), who argues that the delegation of administrative authority to
regional units is a ruler’s rational response to territorial expansion. Again, this could
create a link between diversity and states that operates through the geographic scope of
a society, and not through trade.
I have three strategies for dismissing this alternative explanation of my results. The
first is to adopt the “virtual countries” approach of Michalopoulos (2008). I divide the
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TABLE 11. Alternative stories: Artificial countries and area groups
[Table 11 here]
African continent into squares 1◦ by 1◦ (see Figure 7) and repeat the main analysis. Ex-
cepting coastal societies, the units of observation now all have the same area. Because
several ethnic groups might intersect a single square, I keep the levels of jurisdiction
of the most centralized state as that square’s measure of state centralization; that so-
ciety’s crop type, date of observation, and ethnographic region are also kept for the
analysis. Results are presented in Table 11. These are even more statistically robust
than the main results. Similarly, because the unit of observation for the main analysis
is the ethnic group, this approach mitigates the concern that multi-ethnic states will be
“double-counted” in the data.
Second, I restrict the sample to societies of similar areas. I compute area quintiles for
all ethnic groups. In Table 11, I report the results if the smallest quintile (Q1), largest
quintile (Q5) or both are dropped. Results are robust to this sample restriction, and
the coefficients on ecological diversity are greatest when both the largest and smallest
ethnic groups are removed from the sample. Third, I control for area directly in Table 13
and show that the main effect does not disappear. I discuss this in greater detail below.
5.2. States conquer trading regions. The second alternative explanation of the results
is that states emerge for reasons unrelated to the gains from trade, and then move to
occupy prime trading regions through migration or conquest. My first argument against
this alternative story is to appeal to the artificial country results above. That similar
results can be achieved using units with regular boundaries suggests that diversity does
not result from the irregularly-shaped boundaries of ethnic groups that have conquered
their surroundings in ways that overlap with ecology. My second strategy for dismissing
this alternative story is to give narrative evidence on the most influential (in terms of
dfbeta) societies in the data. The top fourteen of these are listed in Table 12. The central
argument of this paper is that trade causes states. If the centralized societies in this list
are known to have developed states where they are, rather than migrating to capture
them, this supports the Ricardian view. Further, if these states derived their wealth and
power from their location relative to geographically-shaped trade routes, it is evidence
that profitable trade routes were necessary for states to exist in these locations. I choose
six of the most influential centralized states for case study evidence.
It is possible that not all societies are able to take advantage of gains from trade in
order to become states. Groups that look different from their neighbors early on may
expand in response to new trading opportunities not seized by other societies around
them. This need not, on its own, imply rejection of the basic argument that this ex-
pansion was based on trade. What is critical is whether the society would have had the
resources to become a regional power in the absence of revenues and other benefits
coming from this trade. Alternative stories: Six influential states
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TABLE 12. Alternative stories: Six influential states
[Table 12 here]
There are six centralized states in Table 9 – the Yoruba, Songhai, Toro, Suku, Luba and
Lozi. To test the “Ricardian” view, I ask five questions in each case. First, did these so-
cieties participate in trade? Second, was trade a source of wealth for the society? Third,
was trade a source of state power? Fourth, did these polities rise and fall with the for-
tunes of external trade? Fifth, did these states move to capture trading regions after they
grew strong? I summarize the answers to these questions in Table 12. While the evi-
dence does not in every case support the view that trade promotes states rather than
the reverse (especially the answers to the fourth question), it is broadly consistent with
this interpretation.
Yoruba. Morton-Williams (1969) argues that Yoruba Oyo and Akan Ashanti “devel-
oped under the stimulus of external trade, owing much from their beginnings to their
proximity to the Mande trade routes in the north, and later also to their fortunate posi-
tions in the hinterlands during the growth of the maritime markets on the coast.” Law
(1977) is more guarded, suggesting that three factors together explain the rise of Oyo –
the strength of its imported cavalry, its participation in long-distance commerce with
the north, and its engagement in the Atlantic slave trade, the latter being followed by
Oyo’s imperial expansion. It is clear that trade was important in the Oyo economy. Oyo
cloth was sold to Dahomey and Porto Novo, and the state imported kola nuts from the
forest areas of Yorubaland for consumption and re-export. Salt and camwood were im-
ported, and the latter was re-exported to Nupe. The horses on which the Oyo cavalry
depended were also imported from the north, albeit in return for slaves. Critically, Law
(1977) shows that the Alafin (king) relied heavily on trade taxes for his revenues; even
direct taxes were collected in cowries and other currencies that were largely acquired
through trade. Further, he and other chiefs engaged in trade personally. Trade upheld
the authority of the Alafin by permitting him to maintain a superior standard of life, and
by enabling him to distribute money and trade goods. The story that emerges from the
accounts of Morton-Williams (1969) and Law (1977), then, is of a state that depended
on trade across ecological zones for its existence, but was spurred to expand by the rise
of the coastal slave trade. Neither author mentions conquest of neighboring regions as
a pre-condition for trade.
Songhai. The Songhai Empire, with its capital at Gao, took advantage of a weakened
Mali to become free from Malinke control in 1340. Levzion (1975) only links this weak-
ness to trade conditions in a roundabout way, noting that Mali power in Timbuktu was
dislodged by first Mossi and later Tuareg raids. Gao was captured by Moroccan forces
in 1591, after which the empire fractured. Levzion (1975) attributes Songhai weakness
at this point to a divisive civil war, and not to trade factors. It is clear that the empire
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depended for its wealth on the trans-Saharan trade. Neumark (1977) attributes the suc-
cess, not only of Songhay but of the states that preceded it, to “their strategic commer-
cial position on the fringes of the Sahara.” Songhay exported principally gold and slaves,
as well as ivory, rhinoceros horns, ostrich feathers, skins, ebony, civet, malaguetta pep-
per, and semi-precious stones. It re-exported cloth and leather goods from Hausaland
and kola from the forest zone. It imported salt, linen, silk, cotton cloth, copper utensils
and tools, ironwork, paper, books, weapons, cowries, beads, mirrors, dates, figs, sugar,
cattle and horses. Leo Africanus noted the empire’s prosperity, as abundant food could
be produced in the southern savanna and shipped to Timbuktu via the Niger (Levzion,
1975). Lovejoy (1978), similarly, notes that Timbuktu and Gao, Songhay’s most impor-
tant cities “controlled trans-Saharan trade, desert-side exchange, and river traffic on the
Niger. Located in the Sahil but with easy access to western and central savanna, they
were at the hub of overland and river routes where staples of desert-side trade such as
grain and salt could readily be transferred from river boat to camel, and vice versa.”
Songhay was the first Sudanic empire whose power reached as far as the salt mines of
Taghaza (Levzion, 1975). Shillington (1989) notes taxes on trade as a key source of gov-
ernment revenue.
It is true that, after its establishment, Songhay did expand – Bovill (1995) writes that
Songhay moved into the Hausa states to capture their quality land and into Air to drive
out Tuareg raiders. Levzion (1975) adds that these conquests were largely along the
Niger river, because of Songhay’s dependence on its Sorko fleet for its military power.
This is not necessarily counter to the Ricardian view. In the case of Air, this was a move-
ment to protect existing trade interests, not to secure new routes. The strength of Song-
hay, like many of the states that came before it, had already been based on its favorable
location for trade before it began its expansion.
Toro. One of Uganda’s four traditional kingdoms, Toro broke free of Bunyoro in 1830,
was reconquered in 1876, and became independent once again with Lugard’s help in
1891. The base of economic production in Toro was hoe-cultivation of finger-millet,
plantains, sweet potatoes and beans, though a cattle-keeping class existed (Taylor, 1962).
Under Bunyoro control, the territory produced iron goods and salt for sale within the
interlacustrine region (Ingham, 1975). This shaped the revenues of subordinate states;
the Babito chief of Kisaka introduced agents to collect tax from both salt producers and
traders, a portion of which was sent to Bunyoro (Ingham, 1975). Trade was a source of
revenue to the state, both through tribute collection and direct control. Taylor (1962)
states that the king, chiefs and lords of Toro maintained control over land, cattle, lakes,
salt lakes, medicinal springs, canoe services, and “certain commodities having exchange
or prestige value,” such as tusks and lion skins. They collected many of these same goods
as tribute, as well as labor and military service, and reallocated them to relatives, chiefs,
officials and others. He further suggests that the “distribution of goods and services”
was mainly through kinship and feudal systems, though barter was also present.
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Ingham (1975) describes the Toro region as one of relative prosperity. The Toro kings
sold slaves, ivory and cows to Arab traders in return for guns and cloth (Taylor, 1962).
Independent Toro was also an exporter of salt; Good (1972) notes that, until 1923, the
okukama or Mukama (king) of Toro held personal ownership over the trade in salt from
Lake Katwe and other lake deposits near Kasenyi. This was sold for regional consump-
tion in Bunyoro, ocassionally as far east as Lake Victoria, in Rwanda and Tanzania, and
into the Congo perhaps fifty miles beyond the present border (Good, 1972). This was,
however, an example of a state expanding to take advantage of a tradable resource. Lake
Katwe was in Busongora, which had also seceded from Bunyoro, and which was an early
conquest by independent Toro (Good, 1972). Bunyoro recaptured the territory during
the 1880s.
Suku. The Suku are a petty state in the Congolese savanna, part of the Central African
“matrilineal belt.” They appear to have become independent from the Lunda empire
during the early nineteenth century by moving into vacant land east of the Kwango val-
ley (Kopytoff, 1965). This was precipitated by the collapse of Lunda rule over the region
as a whole (Kopytoff, 1964). Kopytoff (1965) writes that Suku participation in the rubber
trades of the nineteenth century and Second World War was “marginal,” and that these
periods were “the only ones when the Suku had any cash crops to sell. At present, the
region is both too poor and too far from the centers to export a commercially feasible
product of any kind.” Similarly, the Suku lacked a developed system of market places
and itinerant trade was “not at all developed” (Kopytoff, 1967). The Suku did, however,
participate as middlemen in the long-distance trade between the raffia and palm-oil
producers north and east of them and southern groups who traded directly with the Por-
tuguese (Kopytoff, 1967). They also purchased raw raffia for weaving into cloth, which
was exported to the southeast along with palm oil in return for shell money and Eu-
ropean goods, some of which were exported (Kopytoff, 1967). The Suku were known
for their wealth in shell money. The Suku MeniKongo (king) actively ruled over some
twenty or thirty villages around the capital, and administered the remainder of his king-
dom through regional chiefs. Kopytoff (1964) tells us that shell money was legal tender
in rendering tribute to chiefs, so the same logic as used by Law (1977) implies that direct
taxes were, indirectly, taxes on trade.
Given that much of the Suku kingship terminology is Lunda, Kopytoff (1965) supposes
that Suku political organization (like that of the neighboring Yaka) is also Lunda in ori-
gin. Lunda dominated the upper Kasai basin from c. 1700 (Birmingham, 1976). Within
the empire’s territory lay both copper mines and salt, which were sources of both trade
and tribute (Birmingham, 1976). Slaves for export were collected through both war and
the tributary system of tax collection, and this revenue allowed the royal court to judi-
ciously distribute the trade goods over which it held a virtual monopoly (Birmingham,
1976). The Suku inherited state forms from their trading predecessor, and prospered
from their position as middlemen.
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Luba. The separate Luba states were not unified until the eighteenth century (Birm-
ingham, 1976). Before this period, separate Luba states such as Kikonja or Songye had
control of localized dired fish, salt, oil palm, raffia cloth, and copper-working industries
(Birmingham, 1976). Trade was largely “vertical,” collected by chiefs as tribute, and no
class of “horizontal” traders exchanging goods between producers emerged before the
growth of the Luba empire. In the late eighteenth century, Luba Lomami responded
most vigorously to the new long distance trade in ivory and slaves (Birmingham, 1976).
Bisa traders exchanged cloth, beads and cattle for tusks that were sold subject to tax-
ation and supervision by either the royal household or by chiefs (Birmingham, 1976).
This trade was preceeded by “pioneering chiefs,” who advanced into new lands and ar-
ranged for the purchase of ivory while at the same time creating “a more or less perma-
nent Luba political superstructure” behind which the Bisa traders followed (Birming-
ham, 1976).
After 1780, the Luba expanded, first into the space between the Lualaba and Lake
Tanganyika, and later into the fishing and palm oil areas of the Lalaba lakes, the cop-
per production portions of the Samba, and the ivory-producing province of Manyema
(Birmingham, 1976). At its peak in the mid-nineteenth century, the empire presided
over “a wide-ranging and international trade” in oil, salt, poisons, drums, slaves, copper,
palm cloth, baskets, iron, skins and fish. Wilson (1972) argues that long-distance trade
was the cause of this expansion. The slave trade pushed Lunda to establish Kazembe as
a tributary kingdom. Sub-regional specializations, such as Sanga production of copper
crosses, was stimulated by the influx of trade goods. Luba-Lomami itself began as a pro-
ducer of salt and hoes, sold in neighboring regions. New trades developed in response
to trade goods; for example, the traditional trade with the Holoholo was supplemented
with beads and ivory. Birmingham (1976) argues that the decline of the Luba kingdom
followed that of the ivory trade. Their Yeke-Nyamwezi trading partners began to focus
on copper, conquering production centers belonging to Mpande and Katanga. Swahili-
Arab traders began to trade directly into the forest, cutting out the Luba. With ivory be-
coming scarce and the price of slaves declining, the Luba were unable to purchase the
guns needed to secure their power without exporting large numbers of internally cap-
tured slaves. The kingdom disintegrated into warring factions and became dominated
by its neighbors.
Lozi. The pastoral Lozi (or Barotse) have occupied the Barotse floodplain of the Zam-
bezi river since roughly 1600 (Gluckman, 1941), and have had a centralized king since at
least as early as the start of the nineteenth century (Birmingham, 1976). There was con-
siderable trade within Lozi territory in the specialized products of each region – bulrush
millet and cassava meal, wood products and iron were brought in from the bush areas,
and the Zambezi facilitated transport (Gluckman, 1941). He further suggests that Lozi
domination of its surroundings was facilitated by the society’s internal cohesion, stem-
ming from the inequality made possible by royal control of the most productive farming
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mounds within the floodplain, as well as a need to protect cattle in outlying areas dur-
ing the flood season. The result was that the Lozi traded with its neighbors as they did
not trade among themselves. Further, the king and princess chief both collected tribute
in the form of specialized production of the “tribes” under his command, including ca-
noes, weapons, iron tools, meat, fish, fruit, salt, honey, maize and manioc (Birmingham,
1976).
The Lozi were ruled between 1840 and 1864 by the Sotho-speaking Kololo who in-
vaded from the south. The Lozi spurned Lovale traders before the emergence of the
trade in slaves and ivory in southern Kololo around 1850. Before this, they had sent
traders to the Lunda areas of the upper Zambezi, trading only indirectly with the Por-
tuguese (Flint, 1970). Flint (1970) suggests that the major change was the rise of the ivory
trade relative to the slave trade by 1853. He argues that the Kololo used Livingstone as
a ‘prestigious outsider,’ helping them negotiate with the peoples through whose terri-
tory the Lozi traded. By 1860, long distance trade had become of major importance to
the Barotse. The Kololo obtained ivory either as tribute from the Barotse or by selling
iron hoes to the Tonga, and then sold this ivory either to middlemen or directly to the
coast. The Lozi also exported cattle and forest products in return for trade goods during
this period (Gluckman, 1941). Trade gave the Kololo king an independent power base,
strengthening him against other chiefs who depended on cattle raiding for revenue. He
worked to establish a new set of ‘caravan chiefs’ (Flint, 1970).
Flint (1970) suggests that the more trade-oriented Barotse of the floodplain came into
conflict with the southern Kololo, whose raids on their neighbors disrupted trade, and
who refused to move the capital into the floodplain where it would be better situated
relative to trade routes. Further, the king received profits from ivory and distributed
within his court, shutting out the Barotse. Though the details are not clear, Birmingham
(1976) ties the restoration of Lozi independence to this trade. He argues that traders
operated independently of the state, and the second Kololo king was followed by an
interregnum before a Lozi king was restored in the 1870s. He suggests that the western
ivory trade “may have facilitated” this restoration. Gluckman (1941) suggests that the
restored Lozi king traded cattle, ivory and slaves on his own account for trade goods
that he distributed, both among his own people and among subject tribes.
Overall, these are consistent with the Ricardian view that opportunities for trade give
rise to states. While Songhai and Oyo expanded to capture more territory, they did so
after having arisen in a location favorable to trade across ecological zones. The Luba
too expanded after 1780, but did so based on power already acquired through prox-
imity to the Bisa ivory trade. When that trade declined, the kingdom collapsed. The
pre-Kololo Lozi dominance over surrounding peoples, while stemming in part from the
cohesion deriving from their environment, also depended on the ability to trade and
collect tribute in the diverse products of their neighbors. That the Suku participated in
long-distance trade while possessing only limited internal markets further supports that
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TABLE 13. Alternative stories: Additional controls and ethnic competition
[Table 13 here]
it is the ability to trade the products of different macro-ecological regions that matters
most. In every case, rulers relied heavily on taxing trade. The exception is Toro, which
emerged in a region with an existing trade in salt and iron, but conquered Busongora in
part to capture the most important source of salt in the region. Toro, however, inherited
its political structure from Bunyoro, which had previously grown strong in part due to
its sale of metal goods and control of the Kibiro salt industry.
My third strategy for dismissing this alternative explanation is to control directly for
area. This is not done in the main analysis, because it is potentially endogenous. States
that independently develop strong states might have larger areas, biasing the coefficient
on both area and potentially on the other coefficients. With that caveat in mind, if it is
only through expansion that states become correlated with ecological diversity, there
should be no correlation conditional on area. I include it, then, as an additional regres-
sor in Table 13. The impact of area is negligible, and the coefficient remains significant,
positive, and of a similar magnitude.
5.3. Islands of quality. The third alternative story is that states emerge to protect “is-
lands” of particular quality. This competition is fiercest when these islands are very dif-
ferent from neighboring areas, and areas with diverse land qualities will similarly have
diverse ecologies. Jones (2003, p. 105-106), similarly, argues that the European patch-
work of nation states (as opposed to China’s unifying empire) was based on the preva-
lence of fertile islands separated by natural boundaries. This is also similar to Allen’s
(1997) view that the Egyptian state benefitted from the fact that its citizens were con-
fined to a fertile valley surrounded by desert. Carneiro (1970), likewise, has noted that
the Nile, Tigrus-Euphrates, and Indus valleys as well as the Valley of Mexico and the
mountain and coastal valleys of Peru were all areas of circumscribed agricultural land.
In columns 3 and 4 I control for the range of agricultural constraints – the difference in
land quality between the best and worst points in a society’s territory. This does dimin-
ish the effect of ecological diversity, though it remains significant when regional fixed
effects are not included. That the range of agricultural constraints is not significant,
however, suggests it should not be included in the best specification. Results are also
robust to including the presence of bovines as a control (not reported).
5.4. Populationdensity. Fourth, it is possible that ecological diversity is correlated with
population density, which alone explains the centralization of pre-colonial African states.
I add population density in 1960, published by the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme, as a proxy for historical population density.15 This is reported in columns 5
and 6 of Table 13, and the effect of ecological diversity remains intact.
15Raster data taken from http://na.unep.net/datasets/datalist.php.
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TABLE 14. Mechanisms: Other institutional outcomes
[Table 14 here]
5.5. Ethnic competition. Fifth, it is possible, combining the stories of Michalopoulos
(2008) and Tilly and Ardant (1975), that ecology-specific human capital gives rise to a
greater number of ethnic groups in regions of diverse ecology, and that competition be-
tween these groups leads to greater state centralization. To show that this is not driving
my results, I return to my sample of artificial countries. For each square, I count the
number of ethnic groups that intersect it in Murdock’s map, and include this as an ad-
ditional control in Table 13. In column 1, there is a positive but insignificant correlation
between diversity and the number of ethnic groups in an “artificial country.” This is an
artefact of the specification chosen – if I take the full sample of artificial countries (rather
than only those for which information on states are available) the correlation is strong
and positive, confirming the Michalopoulos (2008) result with a different measure of ge-
ographic heterogeneity. If I include the number of ethnic groups as an additional con-
trol, this does not diminish the direct effect of ecological diversity on states, suggesting
that this and the gains-from-trade explanation of states are not mutually exclusive.
6. MECHANISMS
6.1. How does trade cause states? There are many reasons centralized states might
arise due to gains from trade. In Table 14, I test whether the Ethnographic Atlas supports
any of these. The first possible mechanism is to take over the authority of other smaller
states in its vicinity. The atlas contains a variable (V32) that records the number of “lev-
els of local jurisdiction.” Following Bolt and Smits (2010), I take this as a crude measure
of the strength of local states, and use it as an outcome in place of state centralization
in (2). While there is a suggestive negative correlation between ecological diversity and
local states when no other controls are added, this is not robust to the inclusion of other
variables or to region fixed effects. Similarly, V72 records the rules for succession to the
office of the local headman. I construct a “headman is appointed” dummy if this rule
is “appointment by higher authority.” There appears to be no correlation in the data. I
am not able to conclusively test for the spread of Islam as a mechanism. The data only
state whether high gods are “supportive of human morality”, which is only positive for
a handful of societies outside of the Moslem Sudan, Western Sudan and Ethiopia. This
is only for a sample roughly half the size of the main sample, and does not appear to be
related to ecological diversity, though its collinearity with the region fixed effects make
it impossible to test whether it this is the case within regions.
Another possible mechanism for the rise of states is the ability of kings to amass
wealth through taxation, letting them gain prestige and control the flow of tribute. To
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TABLE 15. Mechanisms: Other sources of trade
[Table 15 here]
test for this mechanism, I use V66, “class stratification among freemen,” which is di-
vided into five levels. In order, these are “absence among freemen,” “wealth distinc-
tions,” “elite,” “dual,” and “complex.” Here there is a strong relationship between gains
from trade and inequality. Results (not reported) are similar if a binary class stratifi-
cation measure is used. Similarly, I test whether there is a relationship between gains
from trade and one particular form of inequality – slavery. V70 codes slavery into four
levels. These are “absence or near absence,” “incipient or nonhereditary,” “reported but
type not identified,” and “hereditary and socially significant.” While there is a positive
correlation of ecological diversity and slavery conditional on other controls, this is not
apparent in the unconditional correlation, nor when regional fixed effects are added.
Many of these results are statistically weak, but they do suggest strong links between
trade and class stratification.
It is also interesting to note that the ecological diversity variable does predict modern
economic activity, though not robustly. I use the same ln(1 + Avg. light density) nor-
malization of 2009 nighttime lights as Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010) to test
this. The ecological diversity measure predicts conditional, though not unconditional,
differences in modern light densities. This effect disappears, however, when standard
errors are clustered by ethnographic regions.
6.2. What sort of trade matters? While the ecological diversity measure serves as a
proxy for the capacity to trade products from different ecological zones, it will not cap-
ture other forms of trade. In Table 15, I test whether three other sources of trade – fish-
ing, iron, and gold – give similar rise to states. A society’s percentage dependance on
fishing is V3 in the Ethnographic Atlas. I find no correlation between this and states.
While it is possible that the impact of fishing is being hidden by the impacts of other
controls (notably coastal distance and major rivers), regressing states on the fishing
variable similarly does not yield a significant result (not reported). To test the impor-
tance of minerals, I take data from the US Geological Service’s Mineral Resources Pro-
gram.16 These records contain data on both metallic and nonmetallic mineral resources
at specific sites, with their latitudes and longitudes. “Iron” is the number of deposits of
iron found within an ethnic group’s territory, and “gold” is analogously defined. If there
is likely to be any endogeneity bias from using modern data, it will be positive, since
states that have inherited the strength of their pre-colonial predecessors will likely be
better able to exploit their countries’ resources. Despite this, I find no evidence that
iron matters. Gold enters significantly having either mineral within an ethnic group’s
16The data are available at http://mrdata.usgs.gov/
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TABLE 16. Mechanisms: Regressions of SCCS measures of trade on state centralization
[Table 16 here]
TABLE 17. Mechanisms: Local or long distance trade?
[Table 17 here]
TABLE 18. Mechanisms: Is Africa different?
[Table 18 here]
territory when no controls are added, though the effect of gold is marginally insignifi-
cant with controls. “Salt” is the number of salt-producing cites listed by Sundstr
”om (1974) within an ethnic group’s territory.17
While the sample of African societies in the SCCS is too small to use for comparing
that source’s data on trade with the main sample here, I can test whether state central-
ization is correlated with any particular form of trade in the SCCS’s global sample of
ethnic groups. In Table 16, I present the results of regressing several of these indicators
on the state centralization measure and a constant. The presentation here is similar to
Table 5. I find that societies with states are more likely to trade for food, through more
levels of intermediation, and that this trade is more important to their subsistence. Po-
litical power is more likely to depend on commerce in more centralized states, trade
and markets are more likely to exist, and exchange is more important both within and
beyond the community, though this latter correlation is not significant at conventional
levels.
Interestingly, Tables 16 and 15 suggest that it is more mundane, intra-community
trade in products such as food, rather than long distance trade in products such as gold
and ivory, that matters for the formation of states. The main data sources here do not
allow for these two types of trade to be conclusively tested against each other. However,
the “ecological diversity” measure is more intuitively related to trade that is possible
within an ethnic group’s borders, while the “distance from an ecological divide” variable
is more suggestive of long distance trade. In Table 17, I test whether the estimated ef-
fect of either one disappears when both are included as regressors. They are, however,
strongly correlated (see column 1), which limits the power of this test. With controls,
both coefficients fall relatively 40% relative to their values in Tables 4 and Table 6. The
distance from a divide remains more statistically robust, especially once regional fixed
effects are added. It is not, then, possible to rule out the importance of either long dis-
tance or local trade.
17Of 271 sites he lists, I match 84 to ethnic groups in the data and 157 to specific geographic locations,
such as Cape Lopez. For 30 I could not find a match.
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6.3. Is Africa different? In other work, I have assembled an analogous data-set for all
1,267 societies of the Ethnographic Atlas.18 While some of the controls used here are
either not available or computed somewhat differently in that data, I am able to expand
the present analysis to the whole world. Results in Table 18 suggest that Africa is not
different: in a sample of more than 1,000 societies from around the world, ecological
diversity continues to predict the existence of states.
7. CONCLUSION
I have used this paper to provide empirical support for Bates’s (1983) Ricardian view
of pre-colonial African states. The gains from trade stemming from ecological diver-
sity predict the presence of state centralization across sub-Saharan societies recorded
in the Ethnographic Atlas. Moving from a homogenous zone to one that is ecologically
diverse predicts that the chance a society is centralized rises between 6 and 13 percent-
age points. Distance from an ecological divide serves as well in predicting states. There
is no evidence this is overstated due to endogeneity or the influence of outliers or spe-
cific ethnographic regions. The histories of African societies are consistent with this
interpretation of the data, rather than one in which states emerge and then migrate.
Similarly, area, defense of fertile islands, correlation with dense population, and ethnic
competition do not explain the results. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2010) show
that the strength of pre-colonial African states does more to predict modern develop-
ment, using night-time lights as a measure, than country-level institutions. These states
are rooted in the intersection of ecology and trade.
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TABLE 19. Full results
[Table 19 here]
  Abuts ecological divide  Diversified area  No ecological variation  
Kinship 12% 17% 40%
Chiefs 38% 50% 20%
Central monarch 50% 33% 40%
N 8 6 20
Absent 25% 40% 67%
Present 75% 60% 33%
N 8 5 18
Absent 38% 40% 50%
Present 62% 60% 50%
N 8 5 20
Local level 62% 40% 50%
Regional level 0% 20% 10%
National level 38% 40% 40%
N 8 5 20
Notes: Adapted from Bates (1983), p. 43.
Table 1. Bates' evidence
Army commanded at 
National army 
Central bureaucracy 
Political structure 
Mean s.d. Min Max N
State centralization 1.15 0.93 0 4 440
Any centralization 0.73 0.44 0 1 440
Local state 2.91 0.68 2 4 439
Class stratification 1.25 1.41 0 4 364
Slavery 1.83 1.03 0 3 383
Headman appointed 0.066 0.25 0 1 320
Light density 1.50 0.18 1.15 3.34 440
Ecological diversity 0.30 0.23 0 0.80 440
Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.47 0.23 0 0.80 440
Predicted Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.20 0.21 0 0.70 440
Dist. ecological divide 0.45 0.53 0.019 2.95 440
Any diversity 0.78 0.42 0 1 440
Salt 0.42 0.88 0 6 440
Gold production 0.34 1.86 0 24 440
Iron production 0.12 0.33 0 1 440
% dep. on fishing 8.32 10.9 0 70 440
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Outcomes
Gains from trade
Mean s.d. Min Max N
Major river 0.23 0.42 0 1 440
Ag. constraints 5.41 1.06 2.94 8.92 440
Dist. coast 5.54 3.76 0 14.9 440
Elevation 728 520 -7.41 2,308 440
Malaria 0.83 0.27 0 1 440
Precipitation 1,194 528 32.4 2,954 440
Ruggedness 71,792 70,413 0 421,381 440
Temperature 8,882 1,112 5,295 10,699 440
Dist. L. Victoria 2,198 1,438 131 5,708 440
Date observed 1,919 21.6 1,830 1,960 440
Dist. Atlantic ST 6,688 1,515 3,671 9,949 440
Dist. Indian ST 4,546 1,589 1,028 7,953 440
Dist. Saharan ST 3,333 975 806 6,999 440
Dist. Red ST 2,887 1,360 107 5,773 440
Crop: Missing 0 0 0 0 440
Crop: None 0.025 0.16 0 1 440
Crop: Trees 0.084 0.28 0 1 440
Crop: Roots/tubers 0.19 0.39 0 1 440
Temperature s.d. 294 292 0 1,635 370
Area 2.43 3.64 8.2e-06 27.0 440
Pop. density 22.2 28.5 0 311 440
Ag. Constraints Range 4.66 1.95 0 9 440
Grain endemicity 0.35 0.25 0 0.76 425
Table 3. Summary Statistics
Controls
Other variables used
(1) (2) (3)
Ecological diversity 0.794*** 0.703*** 0.437**
(0.266) (0.234) (0.219)
Other controls No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes
0 levels -0.259*** -0.220*** -0.132**
(0.087) (0.069) (0.064)
1 level -0.022 -0.024 -0.016*
(0.038) (0.029) (0.009)
2 levels 0.152*** 0.149*** 0.098**
(0.052) (0.050) (0.048)
3 levels 0.118*** 0.091*** 0.048**
(0.044) (0.034) (0.024)
4 levels 0.010 0.004 0.001
(0.008) (0.004) (0.002)
Observations 440 440 440
Table 4. Main Results
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors
in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the
table of summary statistics.
Marginal effects
Dependent variable    Coef s.e. N
v81: Political autonomy 0.485 0.082 182
v82: Trend in political autonomy 0.395 0.069 182
v84: Higher political organization 0.400 0.071 181
v85: Executive 0.801 0.086 181
v89: Judiciary 0.261 0.022 181
v90: Police 0.889 0.080 178
v91: Administrative hierarchy 0.943 0.071 181
v700: State punishes crimes against persons 0.185 0.033 91
v701: Full-time bureaucrats 0.242 0.026 91
v702: Part of kingdom 0.136 0.029 86
v756: Political role specialization 1.220 0.167 89
v759: Leaders' perceived power 0.432 0.069 89
v760: Leaders' perceived capriciousness 0.240 0.097 66
v761: Leaders' unchecked power 0.385 0.076 85
v762: Inability to remove leaders 0.420 0.100 77
v763: Leaders' independence 0.426 0.070 86
v764: Leaders' control of decisions 0.584 0.136 87
v776: Formal sanctions and enforcement 0.412 0.068 89
v777: Enforcement specialists 0.461 0.076 88
v779: Loyalty to the wider society 0.228 0.104 83
v784: Taxation 0.536 0.069 84
v785: Rareness of political fission 0.154 0.102 64
v1132: Political integration 1.185 0.070 118
v1134: Despotism in dispute resolution 0.132 0.023 104
v1135: Jurisdictional perquisites 0.172 0.067 34
v1736: Tribute, Taxation, Expropriation 0.961 0.152 77
v1740: Levels of political hierarchy 1.600 0.196 100
v1741: Overarching jurisdiction 0.331 0.070 94
v1742: Selection of lower officials 0.524 0.061 95
Table 5. Regressions of alternative SCCS measures of states on state centralization
Each row reports the estimated coefficient and standard error when the listed variable in the SCCS is
regressed on state centralization and a constant (not reported). All results are significant at conventional
levels. I have reversed the signs for variables 756, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 776, 777, 779, and
784, so that higher values correspond to greater state strength. I have re-labeled these variables to
capture the positive re-coding, and have re-labeled some other variables so that their meaning is clearer.
I have removed the missing values 0 and 8 from variable 1132, and converted variable 89 into a binary
``judiciary present'' measure, since the categories of judiciary were not clearly ordered.
(1) (2) (3)
Ecological diversity 0.252** 0.280** 0.207*
(0.128) (0.128) (0.118)
Dist. ecological divide -0.326*** -0.301*** -0.267***
(0.078) (0.071) (0.073)
Any diversity 0.480*** 0.359** 0.225*
(0.155) (0.142) (0.126)
Ecological diversity (Simpler classes) 0.907*** 0.793** 0.557
(0.335) (0.311) (0.356)
Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.967*** 0.999*** 0.540**
(0.198) (0.282) (0.275)
Other controls No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes
Observations 440 440 440
Table 6. Robustness: Alternative measures of states and diversity
Any centralization
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions estimated by
ordered probit with coefficients reported, except with "any centralization" as the outcome, in
which case probit is used with marginal effects reported. Standard errors in parentheses clustered
by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics.
State centralization
State centralization
State centralization
(1) (2) (3)
Equation 1 0.778* 0.976**
(0.408) (0.455)
Equation 2 0.916*** 0.848***
(0.282) (0.268)
Equation 3 0.777** 0.865**
(0.359) (0.420)
Equation 4 -1.249* -19.310***
(0.691) (1.282)
Ecological diversity 0.794*** 0.703** 0.661*
(0.212) (0.343) (0.373)
Ecological diversity 0.794*** 0.506** 0.415*
(0.266) (0.257) (0.222)
Ecological diversity 0.794*** 0.693*** 0.423*
(0.266) (0.238) (0.221)
Other controls No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes
Observations 440 440 440
Table 7. Robustness: Estimation methods
State centralization: Alternative regions
State centralization: Generalized ordered probit
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions estimated by ordered
probit. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in
the table of summary statistics.
State centralization: No "trade" controls
State centralization: No date control
Dropped
High 
leverage
High 
dfbeta
South 
African 
Bantu
Ethiopia 
and Horn
Moslem 
Sudan
Indian 
Ocean
Ecological diversity 0.642** 0.958*** 0.735*** 0.752*** 0.611** 0.768***
(0.286) (0.289) (0.228) (0.233) (0.238) (0.226)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No No No No No
Observations 406 411 421 400 417 435
Ecological diversity 0.236 0.682** 0.484** 0.412* 0.369 0.496**
(0.334) (0.285) (0.205) (0.234) (0.229) (0.215)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 406 411 421 400 417 435
State centralization
State centralization
Table 8. Robustness Influential observations
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions
estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other
controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ecological diversity 0.678*** 0.542*** 0.327** 0.699** 0.612*** 0.387**
(0.219) (0.163) (0.150) (0.275) (0.190) (0.191)
Other controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 440 440 440 370 370 370
Ecological diversity 1.597** 1.023 1.335
(0.716) (2.711) (2.366)
Predicted Eco. Div. (FAO) 0.494*** 0.284* 0.037
(0.181) (0.151) (0.179)
Other controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 370 370 370 440 440 440
IV Ordered probit
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics.
Table 9. Robustness: Reverse causation
State centralization
OLS OLS: Temp. s.d. nonmissing
State centralization
(1) (2) (3)
Ecological diversity 1.080*** 0.943*** 0.479**
(0.291) (0.262) (0.229)
Ecological diversity 0.676*** 0.597*** 0.304
(0.233) (0.211) (0.214)
Ecological diversity 0.492** 0.491** 0.326
(0.228) (0.244) (0.228)
Wald test (λ=0) 33.71 1.187 7.22e-06
Ecological diversity 0.697*** 0.512*** 0.304
(0.201) (0.192) (0.196)
WX p 0 0.000 0.000
Moran p 0.278 0.426 0.186
Ecological diversity 0.583 0.730*** 0.449*
(0.420) (0.259) (0.244)
Above Median Diversity SATE 0.202**
(0.096)
4.51 3.08
Other controls No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes
Observations 440 440 440
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions estimated by ordered
probit with coefficients reported, except with spatially correlated errors, described in the text. Standard
errors in parentheses clustered by region, except with spatially correlated errors. Other controls are those
listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics.
State centralization: Interactions with de-meaned controls
Altonji-Elder-Taber Statistics
Nearest Neighbor Matching
Table 10. Robustness: Heterogeneity
State centralization: Latitude/longitude quartic
State centralization: Including area shares
State centralization: Spatially correlated errors
State centralization: Including neighbors' X
(1) (2) (3)
Ecological diversity 0.842*** 0.806*** 0.804***
-0.275 -0.107 -0.179
Ecological diversity 0.957*** 0.914*** 0.554*
(0.327) (0.269) (0.326)
Ecological diversity 0.729** 0.665*** 0.366
(0.284) (0.255) (0.231)
Ecological diversity 0.987*** 1.017*** 0.606**
(0.281) (0.268) (0.299)
Other controls No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes
Observations 440 440 440
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported. Standard
errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of
summary statistics.
State centralization: Drop Area Q5 
State centralization: Drop Area Q1 and Q5
Table 11. Alternative stories: Artificial countries and area groups
State centralization: Artificial countries
State centralization: Drop Area Q1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ecological diversity 0.718*** 0.673*** 0.392* 0.587* 0.535** 0.291
(0.248) (0.228) (0.217) (0.315) (0.259) (0.247)
Area 0.034* 0.021 0.026
(0.020) (0.022) (0.025)
Ag. Constraints Range 0.082** 0.065* 0.055
(0.038) (0.035) (0.035)
Ecological diversity 0.762*** 0.682*** 0.430** 0.753*** 0.703*** 0.390*
(0.260) (0.230) (0.208) (0.273) (0.230) (0.211)
Pop. density 0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Grain endemism 0.442 0.287 0.904**
(0.310) (0.403) (0.395)
Other controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440 440 440
Ecological Diversity 0.369 0.814*** 0.749*** 0.703***
-0.285 -0.27 -0.104 -0.19
No. of Ethnic Groups 0.073 0.123** 0.145***
-0.047 -0.048 -0.048
Other controls No No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No No Yes
Observations 1524 1524 1524 1524
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported.
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the
table of summary statistics.
Table 12. Alternative stories: Additional controls and ethnic competition
State centralization: Additional controls
State centralization: Additional controls
State centralization: Artificial countries and ethnic competition
Name Cent. dfbeta Name Cent. dfbeta
Songhai 3 0.1821782 Barea 0 0.122194
Yoruba 3 0.1704813 Shuwa 2 0.1131304
Chiga 0 0.1550042 Luba 3 0.1105842
Lozi 3 0.1492606 Kunama 0 0.1068234
Bagirmi 3 0.1482568 Rundi 3 0.0934491
Toro 3 0.145315 Fur 3 0.0893164
Laketonga 0 0.1378572 Suku 3 0.0849554
 Yoruba  Songhai  Toro  Suku  Luba  Lozi
Participated in trade?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Trade a source of wealth?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Arguable  Yes  Yes
Trade a source of state power?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Rose and fall with trade?  Arguable  No  No  No  Yes  Arguable 
No capture of trading regions?  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Table 13. Alternative stories: Six influential states
(1) (2) (3)
Ecological diversity -1.108*** -0.207 0.014
(0.311) (0.238) (0.210)
Observations 439 439 439
Ecological diversity 1.226*** 1.474*** 1.333***
(0.346) (0.230) (0.241)
Observations 364 364 364
Ecological diversity -0.139 0.554*** 0.012
(0.355) (0.137) (0.014)
Observations 383 383 383
Ecological diversity 0.105 -0.085 0.000
(0.419) (0.633) (0.045)
Observations 320 320 320
Ecological diversity -0.029 -0.267
(0.454) (0.910)
Observations 242 242
Ecological diversity -0.013 0.088* 0.106**
(robust se) (0.034) (0.045) (0.044)
(clustered se) (0.072) (0.086) (0.093)
Observations 440 440 440
Other controls No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit with coefficients reported. Standard
errors in parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of
summary statistics.
Slavery
Headman is appointed
Table 14. Mechanisms: Other institutional outcomes
Local state
Class Stratification
High gods
Light density
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% dep. on fishing 0.003
(0.004)
Iron production 0.047
(0.165)
Gold production 0.020
(0.016)
Salt 0.040
(0.051)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No No No
Observations 440 440 440 440
Table 15. Mechanisms: Other sources of trade
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered
probit with coefficients reported. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the
table of summary statistics.
Dependent variable    Coef s.e. N
v1: Trade for food 0.324 0.071 181
v2: Food trade intermediation 0.289 0.087 123
v93: Political power via commerce 0.064 0.018 181
v732: Importance of trade in subsistence 0.154 0.056 92
v1007: Trade and markets 0.382 0.104 52
v1733: Exchange within community 0.200 0.096 95
v1734: Exchange beyond community 0.098 0.079 98
Table 16. Mechanisms: Regressions of SCCS measures of trade on state centralization
Each row reports the estimated coefficient and standard error when the listed variable in the SCCS is
regressed on state centralization and a constant (not reported). I have reversed the sign for variable 732
so that higher values correspond to greater trade. I have converted variable 93 into a binary ``power
depends on commerce'' measure if v93 (the most important source of political power) is either 2 (tribute
or taxes), 7 (foreign commerce), or 8 (capitalistic enterprises).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ecological diversity
Ecological diversity 0.549 0.462 0.182
(0.355) (0.341) (0.325)
Dist. ecological divide -0.284*** -0.168 -0.179 -0.217*
(0.016) (0.126) (0.113) (0.130)
Other controls No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes
Observations 440 440 440 440
R-squared 0.424
State centralization
Table 17. Mechanisms: Local or long distance trade?
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors in
parentheses clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary
statistics.
(1) (2) (3)
Ecological diversity 0.892*** 0.892*** 0.604***
(0.196) (0.198) (0.223)
Other controls No Yes Yes
Region F.E. No No Yes
Observations 1129 1076 1076
Table 18. Mechanisms: Is Africa different?
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses
clustered by region. Other controls are those listed as "controls" in the table of summary statistics.
Ecological diversity 0.794*** (0.266) 0.703*** (0.234) 0.437** (0.219)
Ag. constraints -0.018 (0.059) -0.020 (0.056)
Dist. coast 0.024 (0.026) 0.036 (0.031)
Elevation 0.000 (0.000) 0.001** (0.000)
Malaria -0.501 (0.306) -0.248 (0.302)
Precipitation 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Temperature -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Dist. L. Victoria 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Date observed -0.003** (0.002) -0.005** (0.002)
Crop: None -1.558** (0.772) -0.481 (0.818)
Crop: Trees 0.136 (0.325) -0.020 (0.338)
Crop: Roots/tubers 0.456** (0.203) 0.304 (0.205)
Major river 0.268* (0.155) 0.283** (0.138)
Ruggedness 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000)
Dist. Atlantic ST 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001)
Dist. Indian ST -0.001 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Dist. Saharan ST -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Dist. Red ST 0.001 (0.001) 0.001* (0.001)
Region F.E. No Yes Yes
Observations 440 440 440
(1) (2) (3)
Table 19. Full results
State centralization
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Regressions estimated by ordered probit. Standard errors in
parentheses clustered by region. 
